

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY

Implementing Agreement for Co-operation in the Research, Development and Deployment of Wind Turbine Systems Task 11

60th IEA Topical Expert Meeting

"Radar, Radio links and Wind Turbines"

November 18-19, 2009 Marine Kazerne, Kattenburgerstraat 7, Amsterdam

SENTERNOVEM - NETHERLANDS

Organized by: CENER







Scientific Co-ordination:

Félix Avia Aranda

CENER (Centro Nacional de Energías Renovables)

Urb. La Florida C/ Somera 7-9, 1ª

28023 - Madrid - Spain

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CENER Félix Avia Aranda

Urb. La Florida. C/ Somera 7-9, 1^a

C.P.: 28023 - Madrid - Spain Phone: +34 91417 5042 E-mail: <u>favia@cener.com</u>

For more information about IEA Wind see www.ieawind.org



International Energy Agency

Implement Agreement for Co-operation in the Research, Development and Deployment of Wind Turbine Systems: <u>IEA Wind</u>

The IEA international collaboration on energy technology and RD&D is organized under the legal structure of Implementing Agreements, in which Governments, or their delegated agents, participate as Contracting Parties and undertake Tasks identified in specific Annexes.

The IEA's Wind Implementing Agreement began in 1977, and is now called the Implementing Agreement for Co-operation in the Research, Development, and Deployment of Wind Energy Systems (IEA Wind). At present, 24 contracting parties from 20 countries, the European Commission, and the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) participate in IEA Wind. Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, EWEA, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy (two contracting parties), Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway (two contracting parties), Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States are now members.

The development and maturing of wind energy technology over the past 30 years has been facilitated through vigorous national programs of research, development, demonstration, and financial incentives. In this process, IEA Wind has played a role by providing a flexible framework for cost-effective joint research projects and information exchange.

The mission of the IEA Wind Agreement continues to be to encourage and support the technological development and global deployment of wind energy technology. To do this, the contracting parties exchange information on their continuing and planned activities and participate in IEA Wind Tasks regarding cooperative research, development, and demonstration of wind systems.

Task 11 of the IEA Wind Agreement, Base Technology Information Exchange, has the objective to promote and disseminate knowledge through cooperative activities and information exchange on R&D topics of common interest to the Task members. These cooperative activities have been part of the Wind Implementing Agreement since 1978.

Task 11 is an important instrument of IEA Wind. It can react flexibly on new technical and scientific developments and information needs. It brings the latest knowledge to wind energy players in the member countries and collects information and recommendations for the work of the IEA Wind Agreement. Task 11 is also an important catalyst for starting new tasks within IEA Wind.



IEA Wind TASK 11: <u>BASE TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION</u> <u>EXCHANGE</u>

The objective of this Task is to promote disseminating knowledge through cooperative activities and information exchange on R&D topics of common interest. Four meetings on different topics are arranged every year, gathering active researchers and experts. These cooperative activities have been part of the Agreement since 1978.



Two Subtasks

The task includes two subtasks. The objective of the first subtask is to develop recommended practices for wind turbine testing and evaluation by assembling an Experts Group for each topic needing recommended practices. For example, the Experts Group on wind speed measurements published the document titled "Wind Speed Measurement and Use of Cup Anemometry". A document dealing with Sodar measurements are presently under development.

The objective of the second subtask is to conduct topical expert meetings in research areas identified by the IEA R&D Wind Executive Committee. The Executive Committee designates topics in research areas of current interest, which requires an exchange of information. So far, Topical Expert Meetings are arranged four times a year.

Documentation

Since these activities were initiated in 1978, more than 60 volumes of proceedings have been published. In the series of Recommended Practices 11 documents were published and five of these have revised editions.

All documents produced under Task 11 and published by the Operating Agent are available to citizens of member countries participating in this Task.

Operating Agent

CENER

Félix Avia Aranda

Urb. La Florida. C/ Somera 7-9, 1^a

C.P.: 28023 - Madrid – Spain Phone: +34 91417 5042

E-mail: favia@cener.com



COUNTRIES PRESENTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE TASK 11					
COUNTRY	INSTITUTION				
Canada	National Resources Canada				
Denmark	Risø National Laboratory - DTU				
European Commission	European Commission				
Finland	Technical Research Centre of Finland - VTT Energy				
Germany	Bundesministerium für Unwelt , Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit -BMU				
Ireland	Sustainable Energy Ireland - SEI				
Italy	CESI S.p.A. and ENEA Casaccia				
Japan	National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology AIST				
Republic of Korea	POHANG University of Science and Technology - POSTECH				
Mexico	Instituto de Investigaciones Electricas - IEE				
Netherlands	SenterNovem				
Norway	The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate - NVE				
Spain	Centro de Investigaciones Energéticas, Medioambientales y Tecnológicas CIEMAT				
Sweden	Energimyndigheten				
Switzerland	Swiss Federal Office of Energy - SFOE				
United Kingdom	Uk Dept for Bussines, Enterprises & Regulatory Reform - BERR				
United States The U.S Department of Energy -DOE					



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CONTENTS

<u>Pag</u>
Introduction
1. Overview of Present Situation 1
Michael Watson, Pager Power, UK
2. Wind Radar Issues in the USA. 2009 Update
Gary Seifert, Idaho National Lab, USA
3. The Impact of Wind Farms on Marine Radar
Anthony Brown, University of Manchester-Faculty of Engineering & Physical Sciences, UK
4. On the need to identify small, slow and low flying targets
Luit Buurma, Military Aviation Authority, The Netherlands
5. Development of a wind turbine acceptance tool
Arne Theil, TNO Defence, Security and Safety, The Netherlands
6. Radar disturbance by obstacles
Prof.dr.ir. Gert Brussaard, Radicom Consultants, The Netherlands
7. EWEA response to Eurocontrol consultation process on: "Guidelines on
how to assess the potential impact of wind turbines on surveillance sensors"71
Nicolas Fichaux, Head of Policy Analysis, European Wind Energy Association
8. Monitoring effects of wind parks at sea
Ir. Anton Klip, Movares Netherland B.V. – MBM, The Netherlands
9. Wind Turbines in the Radiation Field of Systems from an Analysis and Coexistence Point of View97
DrIng. Gerhard Greving, NAVCOM Consult
10. EUROCONTROL Guidelines
Michel Borely – Secretary of the EUROCONTROL Wind Turbine Task Force, Belgium



11. Theoretical and Measurement Results of the effects of wind turbines of military radar systems and technical assessment methods141
Dr- Ing. A. Frye, EADS – MAS, Signature Technology, Germany
12. Simulating the electromagnetic interaction between wind turbines and radars 153
Markku Sipilä, Johan Sten, VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Finland
13. Measures in 2D Primary Air Surveillance Radars to Reduce Wind Turbine Echo
Interferences
Christoph Neumann1, EADS Deutschland GmbH
14. Sheringham Shoal offshore wind farm. Gapfiller concept solution 169
Dr Eldar Aarholt, Statoil ASA / Teleplan AS, Norway
15. Wind turbines and radars: Radar shadow and how it affect surveillance of the sea 178
Kjell-Ake Eriksson, Swedish Defence Materiel Organisation, Sweden
16. The effects of wind turbines on the operational use of a radar: a case study
Mathijs W. Schouten, TNO, The Netherlands
17. Radar and Wind Turbines 199
Rene de Jongh, Thales Netherland, B.V.
18. Microwave links and UHF Telemetry
Kai Frolic, Pager Power Limited, UK

Summary



1. INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Prepared by SenterNovem, in cooperation with the Dutch Ministry of Defence and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Two IEA Topical Expert Meeting on the Topic "Radar, Radio Links and Wind Turbines" were organized in March 2007 (Oxford, UK) and March 2005 (London, UK). The last meeting was very well-attended with 34 participants, representing seven countries. There was general consensus that the meeting brought to light the varying methods and attitudes, adopted by IEA member countries, in handling issues that exist as a result of interference between radar/radio link systems and wind turbines.

One of the main conclusions about the continuation actions within this area was to arrange future TEM's in this issue, that should include a session for 'break-out' workshops to enable technical Sub Groups to discuss specific topics.

Since the development of wind energy there seems to be a conflict between a sustainable energy supply and air traffic safety as well as safeguarding national security.

The development of wind farms onshore and offshore as a rational and sustainable source of renewable energy interferes with radar surveillance and radio communications. Wind turbines produce shadow in radar beams, the moving blades cause reflections and the intermittent clutter can create false tracks, obscure or seduce real targets. The rotating blades defeat traditional Moving Target Indicator processing. In short: wind turbines cause a lot of trouble.

As the wind turbines and the wind energy sector are the new-comers many wind energy initiatives are frustrated or even put on hold. Different countries apply different rules but as wind energy booms, methods for dealing with the conflict are emerging.

As renewable energy supply, national security and air traffic safety are all of high public interest, it is important to find solutions that satisfy all interests. In the last decade a dialogue has evolved and we see new developments in energy, in air surveillance system as well as new scientific insight. This dialogue and technical developments lead to new possible policies and technical solutions to resolve the conflict.

1.2 EXCHANGE OF KNOWLEDGE

In the previous IEA R&D Topical Expert Meetings on the subject "Radar, Radio and Wind turbines" the effects of wind turbines on radar and radio systems have been presented from the perspective of wind farm and radar system operators. Mitigating techniques and ways to work around the policy issues have been discussed.

The exchange of knowledge and ideas proved to be fruitful as it helped to achieve a common understanding and to overcome differences in the perception of the problem. It was helpful also to share knowledge of the differences in national (planning) policies.



The latest Topical Expert Meeting concluded that further research was needed and that an international standard for safety and acceptance would be helpful. The questions put on the agenda were:

- What criterion /specification is needed to be met by technologies?
- What is an acceptable limit of interference?

What is the situation two years on? What new insights have occurred and what answers to these questions have been found. What are the developments in the conflicting systems (radar and wind)?

In the meeting to be organised in November 2009 experts on this subject from science, radar industry, wind turbine industry, radar system operators and policy makers are invited to exchange knowledge and to come to a common understanding of the developments, conflicts and their solutions.

1.3 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Without being exhaustive several developments show that the challenges of enabling radar surveillance to coexist with wind energy development are on the brink of being found.

In the USA new energy policy promotes the proliferation of wind farms and new rules for siting are discussed. In Sweden research projects lead to the conclusion that a more flexible approach will enable resolution of more conflicts between wind turbines and radar.

In the UK new Guidance to air traffic and wind turbine industries has been developed and published.

The radar industry is actively developing mitigation strategies to counter the negative effects of Wind Farms upon radar coverage. BAE Systems, Raytheon, Thales and others all work hard on new techniques for enabling continued aircraft detection within wind turbine clutter. But also knowledge institutions develop new insights which are of increasing interest to the radar and wind turbine communities.

Within NATO dedicated SET group meetings on the subject were organised between air traffic controllers and radar industry.

In responses to increasing reports of interference between surveillance sensors and wind turbines, the EUROCONTROL Surveillance Team established a Wind Turbine Task Force. In June 2009 EUROCONTROL presented draft "Guidelines on how to assess the potential impact of wind turbines on surveillance sensors". The consultation process has started and will end on 29 January 2010.

1.4 TOPICS 2009

When wind turbines are located in the line of sight of a radar system a variety of interference effects may occur, as shadowing, cluttering, false tracks, loss of track etc. These phenomena have an effect on the air surveillance system and can therefore adversely affect wind farm development. The main topic for this meeting is therefore the emerging standards for safety and security.

Topics for the discussion at this meeting will be:

- Policies
 - o Development of standards and measuring tools



- Terms and definitions for safeguarding the level of performance of air surveillance systems
- o Planning policies, institutions and tools
- o Expanding the energy system and increasing safety and national security
- Types of interference
 - o Interference between a single turbines or a farm and radar systems
 - Understanding explanation
 - o Categorizing, calculating
 - Predicting
- Technical possibilities to mitigate
 - o Software & technology in the radar system
 - o Location & shielding in the energy system
 - o Stealth technology, materials
 - Other Innovations

1.5 PAPERS AND PRESENTATIONS

Experts who plan to attend the meeting are invited to write a paper and/or present their findings in the two day meeting. The presentation and paper should address one of the topics above and might answer one of the following questions:

- 1. Process and policy
- What standards are formulated by whom to safeguard the level of performance of air surveillance systems, and in what terms and definitions;
- How are these standards integrated in planning policies and institutions;
- What kind of tools are used to measure the standards, or the performance;
- Which policies meet the challenge to expand the energy system whilst maintaining required levels of air safety and national security;
- Which effects are acceptable and to what extent; can their impact on the mission of the radarsystem be negligible;
- In what terms and how are the aim and expected results of the respective mission (ATC, Weather forecast, national security) formulated;
- For each country is there a process of formulating mission standards and what does this process look like;
- How can formulated safety standards be translated into a level of probability of detection;
- What effects influence the probability of detection most and when concurrently;
- Which effects occur with just one turbine and which effects occur for multiple turbines.

2. Technical issues

- How is energy system technology evolving with respect to stealth design, use of materials and sitting;
- What recent research has been done;
- How is radar system technology evolving with respect to data fusion, multi radar tracking, software, filters etc. and hardware;
- What kind of mitigating measures are effective and feasible;
- What questions have still to be answered by whom (further research).



AGENDA

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

- **9:00** Registration. Collection of presentations and final Agenda
 - 9:30 Introduction by Host

 Jansen Albert, Senior Programma Adviseur, SenterNovem, NL
 - 9:50 Introduction by AIE Task 11 Operating Agent. Recognition of Participants Felix Avia, Operating Agent Task 11
 - **10:10 Presentation of Introductory Note**Jansen Albert, Senior Programma Adviseur, SenterNovem, NL
 - **10:30 Overview of Present Situation** *Mike Watson, Pager Power Limited*

11:00 Coffee Break

1st Session Individual Presentations:

- 11:30 Wind Radar Issues in the USA: a 2009 Update Gary Seifert, Idaho National Lab, USA
- 12:00 Impact of Wind Farms on Marine Radar
 Anthony Brown, Univ. of Manchester-Faculty of Engineering & Physical Sciences, UK
- 12:30 On the need to identify small, slow & low flying targets
 L.S Buurma, Military Aviation Authority NLD, Netherlands

13:30 Boat Trip and Lunch

2nd Session Individual Presentations:

- **16:00 Development of a wind turbine acceptance tool** *Arne Theil*,
- **16:30 Radar disturbances by obstacles** *Gert Brussard, Radicom Consultant, Netherlands*
- 17:00 The position of the European Wind Industry Nicolas Fichaux.

17:30 Coffee Break

18:00 Monitoring effects of wind parks at sea Anton Klip



18:30 Wind Turbines in the radiation field of systems from an analysis and coexistence point of view " / EUROCONTROL Guidelines

Gerhard Greving, NAVCOM Consulting; Germany

19:30 Adjourn

20:00 Dinner at Marine Kazerne

Thursday, November 19, 2009

4th Session Individual Presentations

09:00 EUROCONTROL Guidelines

Michel Borely, Eurocontrol, Belgium

- 09:25 Theoretical and Measurement results of the effects of wind turbines of military radar systems and technical assessment methods

 Andreas Frye, EADS Deutchland GmbH, Germany
- 09:50 Simulating the electromagnetic interaction between wind turbines and radars

Markku Sipilä, VVT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Finland

10:15 Measures in 2D Primary Air Surveillance Radars to Reduce Wind Turbine Echo Interferences

Chistoph Neumann, EADS Deutchland GmbH, Germany

10:40 Coffee Break

5th Session Individual Presentations

- 11:00 Gapfiller concept solution Sheringham Shoal offshore wind farm Eldar Aarholt, Teleplan Consulting, Norway
- 11:25 Radar shadow and how it affect surveillance of the sea

 Kjell-Ake Eriksson, Swedish Defence Materiel Organisation, Sweden
- 11:50 The effects of wind turbines on the operational use of a radar: a case study Mathisi Shouten, TNO, Netherlands
- 12:15 Radar and Wind Turbines

Rene de Jongh, Thales Netherland, B.V.

12:45 Microwave links and UHF Telemetry

Kai Frolic, Pager Power Limited, UK

- 13:15 Lunch
- 14:00 Discussion
- 15:30 Summary of Meeting
- 16:00 Adjourn



1.6 EXPECTED OUTCOME

The goal of the meeting is to gather knowledge on recent developments to make maximum growth of wind energy possible whilst maintaining an acceptable level of safety and security.

By gathering and exchanging information we hope to achieve a common understanding of issues.

These issues are the way wind turbines interfere with radar systems and the developments to handle this interference be it via process, workaround, changing standards, hardware or software of radar systems or via mitigation and developments of wind turbines and farms.

1.7 INTENDED AUDIENCE

The national members will invite potential participants from research institutions, utilities, government other organizations willing to participate in the meeting by means of presenting proposals, studies, achievements, lessons learned, and others.



Summary of IEA RD&D Wind – 60th Topical Expert Meeting

Michael Watson (Pager Power), and Félix Avia (CENER; OA Task 11 IEA Wind),

Background

The development of wind farms interferes with radar surveillance and radio communications. Wind turbines produce shadow in radar beams, the moving blades cause reflections and the intermittent clutter can create false tracks, obscure or seduce real targets. The rotating blades defeat traditional Moving Target Indicator processing.

As renewable energy supply, national security and air traffic safety are all of high public interest, it is important to find solutions that satisfy all interests. In the last decade a dialogue has evolved and we see new developments in energy, in air surveillance system as well as new scientific insight. This dialogue and technical developments lead to new possible policies and technical solutions to resolve the conflict.

Participants / Presentations

A total of 27 persons registered for this meeting. They represented the following countries: Belgium, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, UK and the USA. A total of 18 presentations were given.

The participants represented a great variety of stakeholders related to the topic. Those were: research organizations, universities, consultants, government and military organizations and some manufactures of equipment.

Presentations covered the following topics:

- Policies
 - Planning policies, institutions and tools
 - Terms and definitions for safeguarding the level of performance of air surveillance systems
 - o Development of standards and measuring tools
- Types of interference
 - o Interference between a single turbines or a farm and radar systems
 - o Microwave links and UHF Telemetry
- Technical possibilities to mitigate
 - o Software & technology in the radar system
 - o Location & shielding in the energy system
 - Stealth technology, materials
 - o Other Innovations



A total of 18 presentations were given by:

- Michael Watson (MW), Pager Power, UK
- Gary Seifert (GS), Idaho National Lab, USA
- Anthony Brown (AB), Univ. of Manchester-Faculty of Engineering & Physical Sciences, UK
- Luit Buurma (LB), Military Aviation Authority, Netherlands
- Arne Theil (AT), TNO Defence, Security and Safety, Netherlands
- Prof.dr.ir. Gert Brussaard (GB), Radicom Consultants, Netherlands
- Nicolas Fichaux (NF), Head of Policy Analysis, European Wind Energy Association
- Ir. Anton Klip (AK), Movares Netherland B.V. MBM, Netherlands
- Dr.-Ing. Gerhard Greving (GG), NAVCOM Consult, Germany
- Michel Borely (MB) Secretary of the EUROCONTROL Wind Turbine Task Force, Belgium
- Dr-Ing. A. Frye (AF), EADS MAS, Signature Technology, Germany
- Markku Sipilä (MS), Johan Sten, VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Finland
- Christoph Neumann1 (CN), EADS Deutschland GmbH
- Dr Eldar Aarholt (EA), Statoil ASA / Teleplan AS, Norway
- Kjell-Ake Eriksson (KE), Swedish Defence Materiel Organisation, Sweden
- Mathijs W. Schouten (MW), TNO, The Netherlands
- Rene de Jongh (RJ), Thales Netherland, B.V.
- Kai Frolic (KF), Pager Power Limited, UK



Discussion

Following the two days of presentations the floor was opened and a general discussion took place. A number of different topics were handled. The discussion was coordinated by Michael Watson (MW).

In particular, the following topics were discussed:

- Air Traffic Control (ATC) and National Security
- Assessment Methodology
- Mitigation options
- Who has to pay the cost of mitigation options?
- Future actions under the umbrella of IEA Wind

Air Traffic Control ATC and National Security

First topic discussed was the different approaches for air traffic control [ATC] and National Security. The conclusion is that both sectors are working in parallel directions, trying to find solutions.

The solutions should be available in a short period of time, not longer than two years. The progress needs time, but comparing the situation two years ago when the Oxford meeting was held to the present time, it is clear that we have moved from the discussion about ideological positions to the present situation, where the problem is clearly identified and the work is focussed on finding solutions. It is clear that there is a real problem and real work has been done, and now it is time to move one step further, working out how to develop and implement the existing and identified solutions to solve the problem. Publication of the draft EUROCONTROL guidelines is a good example that real progress has been made.

There are different problems and solutions for both ATC and National Security. The tools and approach used for both are similar although acceptance criteria are different.

One of the first issues discussed was the size of the targets to be detected. For ATC in general larger target sizes are of interest, whereas for National Security, there is requirement to detect smaller targets with radar cross section below 1m².

It was concluded that it is very important to coordinate the work in the two sectors, stimulating the cooperation between the responsible organizations.

Assessment Methodology

The participants agreed that it is crucial to have a harmonised assessment process, in all countries, to analyse the impact of wind turbines on radar and to facilitate the understanding between air traffic control entities, national security organizations and wind developers. The actual situation is that several assessment methodologies are used, as was evident from the various studies presented.

In 2005 the EUROCONTROL Wind Turbine Task Force (WTTF) was established, to define a common ECAC methodology for assessing and avoiding or minimising the potential impact of wind turbines on ATC Surveillance systems. This methodology aims to maintain the necessary levels of



safety and efficiency of surveillance related Air Traffic Services whilst supporting to the maximum extent possible the installation of wind turbines. The WTTF has published the "Guidelines on How to Assess the Potential Impact of Wind Turbines on Surveillance systems", that is now open for consultaion until January 2010, before being approved. These guidelines define a flow diagram of the impact assessment process, but not the assessment methodology to be used.

It was discussed a specific assessment methodology should be recommended under the umbrella of IEA Wind, or if it would be better to adopt the existing EUROCONTROL methodology focussing any IEA activityon improving it. The conclusion was that the EUROCONTROL guidelines are a good starting point and resources would be best spent on improving these.

Mitigation options

Data fusion is an excellent option to mitigate and solve the interference to radar systems from wind turbines. One of the main limitations is that no process is defined covering different aspects of data fusion, for example reliability requirements, the level of information required to pass, the acceptability of data (what data is valid or not), etc.

The first option discussed was the possibility to share data between the ATC sector and National Security sector. The problem is that for security reasons, it is sometimes not possible to share this data.

Several European Radar networks already exist in different sectors, (OPERA in meteorology, RADNET for air traffic control, etc) with the target of harmonizing and improving the operational exchange of radar information between national organizations. The air traffic control organizations of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany, and the EUROCONTROL Agency jointly operate the RADNET network for supplying control centres with radar data.

The problems associated with data communication were also discussed. There are already different options and in particular the use of optic fibre for data transfer, but in general there is a consensus that communication it is not going to be an important problem (GB). The RADNET network, that connects different radar stations located in the four states, converts different radar data formats into one standard, as well as into different output formats.

The option of using an additional radar was also analysed. The solution presented by EA on the Gapfiller concept solution for the Sheringham Shoal offshore wind farm, is a clear option to solve the problem, but it is an expensive solution.

Who has to pay the cost of mitigation solutions?

As renewable energy supply, national security and air traffic safety are all of high public interest, it is important to find solutions that satisfy all interests. However, the general assumption is that wind farms developers should have to pay the cost associated with the required mitigation solutions, due to the fact that aviation and radar installation were installed first. However, some of the radar installations that could be affected are old installations (more than 30 years old) and will need to be modernised, irrespective of any adverse wind farm effects.



Due to environmental and strategic reasons, society clearly requires wind energy systems to be developed over the coming decades. Consequently governments should provide funds to stimulate the development of these systems. The sectors affected by these new installations should take the actions required and should ask their governments for support to cover tassociated costs. The idea of having a centralised funding body in Europe to cover the cost does not seems viable.

In the UK the Crown Estate will cover the initial cost of the modifications required to guarantee ATC systems and National Security, and subsequently will charge the cost to the developers by yearly payments.

All sectors require wind farm developers to pay costs associated with any indirect impacts. It is necessary to reach a reasonable agreement between different groups (developers, manufacturers, airport authorities, national security organizations, etc.) negotiating the contribution that should be paid by each actor. As an example reported, it has been stated that the cost associated with the modifications required to connect a wind farm to the grid has been shared between TSO and wind farms developers (NF).

However no solution seems easy to find, and any solution will require a clear organizational process involving all actors.

Future actions under the umbrella of IEA Wind

At the end of the meeting future actions that could be done under the IEA Wind umbrella were discussed. Most participants were in favour of the establishment of a new Task Group within the IEA's R&D Wind Task 11, to analyse the impacts on radar systems of wind turbines at selected sites, using the same assessment methodology. The output of the study would be very useful for developers, air traffic control organizations and national security departments.

A working group to put forward a proposal to set up a 'new' task area, which specifically addresses Radar, Radio and Wind Turbines topics and issues will be created to prepare the Task document to be distributed at the next Ex Co meeting. Gary Seifert will coordinate this action. The IEA operating agent offered assistance to progress documentation and to facilitate these process.



Participants List - RADAR, RADIO LINKS AND WIND TURBINES - IEA TOPICAL EXPERTS MEETING #60 November 18-19, 2009 Amsterdam

Name	Last Name	Job Center	Country	Phone/Fax	E-mail
Andreas	Frye	EADS Deutchland GmbH	GERMANY	49 421 538 2719	andreas.frye@eads.com
Anthony	Brown	University of Manchester-Faculty of Engineering & Physical Science	UK	00 44 161 275 5107	anthony.brown@manchester.ac.uk
Anton	Klip	Movares Nederland, B.V -	NETHERLANDS	030-265 4737	anton.klip@movares.nl
Arne	Theil	TNO	NETHERLANDS	00 31 70 3740421/654	theil@planet.nl
Brian	Connor	U.S Department of Energy	USA	202-586-3756/5124	brian.connor@ee.doe.gov
Caroline	Faasen	Kema BV	NETHERLANDS	(+31) 26 356 3500/442 8713	Caroline.Faasen@kema.com
Chistoph	Neumann	EADS Deutchland GmbH	GERMANY	49 731 392 4782/20 4782	christoph.neumann@eads.com
Eldar	Aarholt	Teleplan Consulting	NORWAY	47 6712 7000/7270	aar@teleplan.no
Felix	Avia	National Center of Renewables Energy - CENER - CIEMAT	NETHERLANDS	00 34 91 417 50 42/ 556 63 00	favia@cener.com
G.J.M	Van Helderen	Ministry of defence / Defence Material Organisation	NETHERLANDS	00 31 651453454	gjm.v.elderen@mindef.nl
Gary	Seifert	Idaho National Lab	USA	1-208-5269522/2818	Gary.Seifert@inl.gov
Gerhard	Greving	NAVCOM Consulting	GERMANY	49 7144 862560/61	navcom.consult@t-online.de
Gert	Brussard	Radicom Consultant	NETHERLANDS	34 499 425430/400 425 470	gert.brussaard@radicom.nl
Henk	Den Boon	E-connection	NETHERLANDS	00 31 30 659 8000/1	DEN.BOON@E-CONNECTION.NL
Jan	Hunink	Thales Nederland, B.V	NETHERLANDS	00 31 652 484 556/074 2484077	jan.hunink@nl.thalesgroup.com
Judith E	Vlot	SenterNovem	NETHERLANDS	00 31 30 2147213	j.vlot@senternovem.nl
Kai	Frolic	Pager Power	NETHERLANDS	44 1787 315138	kai@pagerpower.co.uk
Kjell-Ake	Eriksson	Swedish Defence Materiel Organisation	SWEDEN	46 8 782 6717	kjell-ake@eriksson@fmv.se
L.S	Buurma	Military Aviation Authority NLD	NETHERLANDS	00 31 70 3167125	LS.Buurma.01@mindef.nl
Markku	Sipilä	VVT Technical Research Centre of Finland	FINLAND	358 40 500 3463/20 722 7029	markku.sipila@vtt.fi
Mathijs W.	Shouten	TNO	NETHERLANDS	00 070 374298/3740654	Mathijs.Schouten@tno.nl
Michael	Watson	Pager Power	UK	44 1787 315138	mike@pagerpower.co.uk
Michel	Borely	Eurocontrol	BELGIUM	00 32 2 279 1161/9086	michel.borely@eurocontrol.int
Nicolas	Fichaux	EWEA, European Wind Energy Assoc.	BELGIUM	32 240 01073	Laurence.blondeau@ewea.org
Ralf	Klinke	AFSBw Dezernat I 3	GERMANY	49 6103-3105-738/799	ralfklinke@bundeswehr.org
René	de Jongh	Thales Nederland, B.V	NETHERLANDS	+31 (0)74 2488111	rene.jongh@nl.thalesgroup.com
VMJ	Gales	Dutch Ministry of Defence	NETHERLANDS	00 31 70 3188467/86658	vmj.gales@mindef.nl



The International Energy Agency Implementing Agreement for Co-operation in the Research, Development, and Deployment of Wind Energy Systems

PRESENTATIONS





www.pagerpower.co.uk

Wind and Radar - Worldwide



- •Its a big issue and its getting bigger
 - More than 20GW wind affected
 - More countries getting concerned every year
 - More radar being impacted every year
- •No silver bullet as far as technical solutions
- •Appears to be a much larger issue in some countries [UK and USA]
- •Smaller issues in others [Denmark]
- •Many bodies looking at the problems
- Some common issues

PAGERPOWER aviation studies

Wind and Radar - Worldwide

- •IEA 3rd Meeting
- •Eurocontrol
- •NATO SET-128
- •EWEA
- •BWEA and AWEA
- Joint MOD and DOD working

Wind and Radar - Common Issues



- On-Line Assessments
- National Security
- Safety
- Cumulative Assessments



- -Main concerns
- -MOU and Guidance
- -MOD infeed project
- -Threat Radar
- -Lighting
- -PAR
- -Raytheon Upgrade
- -SSR distances
- -Stealth
- -Country by Country

Main Concerns PSR - UK

- Clutter
- •Desensitization also known as Overhead Obscuration – different from Clutter
- •Little concern about site monitors in UK
- •Belgium concerns about site monitors
- •Netherlands concerns about shadowing
- Cumulative effects



MoD: Bullamoor windfarm could lead to catastrophic crash

CONTROVERSIAL plans to erect four 120-metre wind turbines on farmland could lead to a catastrophic mid-air collision, the MoD says.

Army experts said the planned development, at Bullamoor, near Northallerton, North Yorkshire, could interfere with radar equipment, putting military and civilian lives at risk.

In a meeting of Hambleton District Council's planning committee yesterday, councillors were told the location of the wind farm could affect systems at nearby RAF Leeming.

Squadron Leader Gavin Pattinson, an air traffic control expert, said aircraft safety was paramount. He said: "Make no mistake that the worst-case scenario is a mid-air collision between two aircraft, with burning wreckage falling to the ground.



Memorandum of Understanding

- •Signed in 2008
- Defence, Transport, Business
- •CAA, NATS, BWEA
- Commitment to work together
- Vague commitment to funding
- Things are improving slowly



Guidance

- •Standard ICAO and CAA guidance for obstructions
- •CAA CAP 764 for wind turbines
- New Eurocontrol Document for Radar
- •CAP 764 used to provide a radar assessment methodology which is now used by MOD



PAGERPOWER


What is Threat Radar?



Three radar in one - Acquisition, Tracking and Missile



Acquisition radar for situational awareness










Missile radar Illuminates target. Missile flies towards illuminated target

What is Threat Radar?


- Mobile radar
- Guides surface to air missiles towards target aircraft
- Used for training pilots need to train to avoid surface to air missiles
- Typically ex-soviet radar used at Spadeadam SA-2 SA-3 SA-6 SA-8 Skyguard ZSU-23 – also European systems and simulator transmitters
- Operating ranges of 10 50km



Aviation Obstruction Lighting

- •Traditionally onshore turbines unlit
- •MOD now requesting lighting mainly because of nighttime helicopter operations
- •Concerns by developers because lighting impact has not been assessed
- •Trying to get very low intensity (or even invisible) lighting. Currently at 25 Candela.
- •Lighting pattern is important.





Precision Approach Radar - PAR

- •Trial has been undertaken in Lossiemouth with ITT PAR
- •Interference has been demonstrated
- •Discussion with ITT practically impossible because of ITAR rules
- •Becoming a big issue in the UK



Raytheon Upgrade

- •Raytheon ASR 23 PSR
- •Project to make it more wind farm tolerant
- •23 Radar
- •Initial £5m has been funded
- Combination of low/high beam
- Improved processing





Secondary Surveillance Radar - SSR

- · Safeguarding Distances in UK
 - •10km general
 - •15nm CAA
 - •16km Eurocontrol
- Reflections
 - False plots
 - Bearing errors
 - Range errors



Stealth Technology



- Low radar cross section blades (and towers)
- Being pursued by Vestas
- Not fully proven
- Single Blade Trial at Swaffham
 Affects RAF Marham Radar



Country Comments

- · Czech Republic Civil/Military
- •Bulgaria Meteorological
- •France Marine, Meteorological and other
- •Belgium Belgocontrol and Military
- Netherlands Military
- **•US Military**
- •Estonia issues
- ·Croatia issues
- Sweden Military
- •Germany Military





Resolving Wind Turbine Radar Interference Issues



Functional Diagram











Operator

Display

System


Radar

Propagation

Turbine



Mitigation





Idaho National Laboratory

Wind Radar Issues in the USA a 2009 Update

November, 2009

Brian Connor

Federal Agency Wind Technology Manager

Gary Seifert

Program Manager, Power Systems Idaho National Laboratories

Jose Zayas

Manager, Wind Energy Technology Dept. Sandia National Laboratories

Mission Need

- Responsible stewardship of national resources to increase the development and deployment of reliable, affordable, and environmentally sustainable wind and water power.
- Actively support the development of 20% U.S. electrical energy produced by wind (20% Wind Energy by 2030).
- Reduces risk to development, increasing domestic energy options (Energy Policy Act of 2005).



 Ensures that 10 percent of our electricity comes from renewable sources by 2012, and 25 percent by 2025 (President's Energy Policy)



Impact


AWEA Survey of members shows:


- 2,100+ megawatts held up
- 5,100+ megawatts deferred
- 2,100+ megawatt abandoned


Yet, only 8000+ Megawatt installed the same year











Program Strategy

DOE is Taking this Concern Seriously

Near-term:

Collaborate with government agencies, other Nations, and industry to develop mitigation approaches that reduce the impact of wind projects on radar systems.

Mid-term:

Develop wind turbine "stealth" technologies and radar gap filler approaches.


Long-term:

Provide support on the modernization of the next generation radar systems.



Needs

- Identify and Streamline Federal Wind Siting Processes
 - Agency by agency review & publication of current requirements
 - Intra-agency streamlining/coordination/appeals
 - Identify agency wind-siting Czar
- Enhance Impacts Screening Capabilities
 - Increase # of tools
 - Develop interactive capabilities
- Increase Testing/Evaluation
 - Impact
 - Mitigation
 - Optimized layouts
- · Launch R&D to Mitigate Interaction
 - Stealth Blades
 - Radar Enhancement
 - Better signal processing
- · Long Term:
 - Timely, Predictable Federal Clean Energy Siting Process



Outreach Activities

Project Consultation

 At the request of project developers and radar agencies, provide independent technical support to resolve permitting delays

Website

Update the one-stop portal for wind project developers to regulatory agencies

Mitigation Tool Box

 Develop and update a common resource for both developers and regulatory agencies that can be used to explore mitigation strategies.





Mitigation - the Key

- · FAA and/or manufacturers mitigation is often available
- Only DOD, DHS, & FAA experts can determine if mitigation is acceptable
- · Examples include, but are not all inclusive
 - Impact studies
 - Farm optimization
 - Refine turbine locations
 - · Checkerboard (one color with gaps)
 - Adjust look angle, use multiple beams selectively
 - Reduce RCA Stealth the Blades
 - Transponder integration
 - Software optimization
 - Added Hardware
 - · Post processors and advanced software
 - Adding transmitters and receivers

Idaho National Laboratory

Mitigation Being Investigated

- · Software improvements being investigated
 - Enhanced clutter mapping
 - Use of RAG Mapping
 - Concurrent processing
 - Separation of high and low beams
 - Tie to advanced clutter and geo based information
 - Improved CFAR processing
 - Improved filtering algorithms
 - Advanced tracking
 - Advanced adaptive Doppler filtering techniques



Short Term Recommendations (the whole list-brainstorm)

Track eligibility

Gap filler radar system criteria and integration

Work on Layouts (radial, checkerboard, etc.)

Quantify/model turbines Integrate and test new algorithms (88-D)

Siting considerations and processes Add 2 pulse cancellation to reduce STC (ASR-11)

Apply advanced tracker

Perform and share advanced wind turbine signature

Look at Doppler-recede vs. approach - filter out receding

Doppler

Get NexRad button on OE-AAA website

Characterize signatures (include rotating effects)

Keep meetings and post minutes Time domain excision - reduce tower return. Same for

Dual pole cancellation of turbines (88-D)

Characterize spectral signatures

Wind community should fund expansion/gap fillers, including long term operations

Foster better communication with industry

Consolidate interagency support teams and fund them to get work done (FAA, DOD, DOE, etc.)

Digitizer upgrades should be developed and implemented New processors may help all radars (many use old technology and all can benefit from increased processing power and inceased memory)

•Integrated processors

ADSP processor

•Post processors

Need a one stop shop

•Permitting

Need a toolbox and checklist to foster complete consistent assessment and better developer

interaction

•support needed to save Gov't time

and improve submittals

•Manual/guidelines needed

•NTIA, OEAAA process needs to

be integrated

•Establish pro

Prioritization was applied and list consolidated



Long Term Recommendations (the whole list - brainstorm)

ASDP processor

Enhance radar

Beacon on turbine (KA band transponder, gives rpm,

yaw, on/off, pitch, etc.) Identify R&D requests

3D) (interpolate to get 3D) Establish a tiger team – optimize what we have

Define terms – consistent line of sight

DOE - Drive industry funded and implemented solutions

Ad a carrier frequency on blade and subsequent filtering Stealth improvements Use new material Apply military knowledge on other systems and apply to

this problem (example - helicopter impacts on radar)

New algorithms to replace MTD

3D radars with good clutter mapping Better multilevel radar and signal processing Simulators - show operators what it will look like up front

Common library/web site to aid in education and assessment Long term planning to help locate radars better

Establish low cost testing apparatus or setup?

Validated models/simulators

Better modeling software (expand RSS) (expand to 88-D) Test turbines in ideal areas for radar testing (OK?)

•Convent (weather gap face array/fusion)

•New/innovative

Fusion

•Blades - US R&D needed

•Nacelle - skin reflection reduction •Tower - skin, shape, or coverings

Improve algorithms

•Altitude •Modify/change MTD/MTI

•Correlation math algorithm determination

·Switchable based on geo

Prioritization was applied and list consolidated



Current Activities

- DOE Wind-Radar
 - Technical Assistance to Agencies & Industry
 - · Weakened by recent JPO change in prescreening support
 - Mitigation Case Studies
 - Demonstrations
 - R&D (Blades, Sensors)
 - General Outreach
 - Multi-pronged approach; multi-stakeholder involvement
 - Collaborative research, case studies, radar evaluations, metrics refinements, tools, mitigation development and information sharing
 - Commission independent wind radar baseline tests
 - Foster technical solutions
 - Reduce encroachment mentality
 - Make results public and shared
 - Shadowing study underway
 - Scheduling three demonstrations
 - · Advanced software on ASR-11
 - · Gap filling radar on ASR-11
 - Concurrent Processing
 - ARSR-4 upgrade requirements document under evaluation



Current Activities

- · Interagency Team
 - Informal Arrangement
 - DOE-Facilitated
 - DOE, DOT, DOD, DHS, Interior, Commerce, USDA
 - Real-time interactions/info & tech exchanges/technical assistance
 - Numerous successful actions completed:
 - \$1.5 B in stuck wind applications approved
 - \$20 M transmission line approved
 - · Archival wind data secured
 - Federal Wind Siting Information/Tools Center
 - New prescreening FAA/DOD and NEXRAD Long-Range Radar tool (Info Center)
 - · Agency toolkit experts workshops
 - R&D/Testing Regime (Underway, Limited DOD and DOE)
 - Model siting protocol (under development BLM/DOD-AF)







Summary

- · Involve all concerned parties
- Approach all issues openly and fairly
- Articulate and quantify Impact
- Address mitigation
- · Communicate well and often
- · Research and mitigations needed
- · Technology improvements needed



































































































Many Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAV's) smaller than biggest bird(flock)s

Why me: 35 years digging for birds in raw radar video

UAV recognition key issue for future national security

Bird recognition key issue for future flight safety

BOTH wanted in MPR replacement programme

IEA radar, radio links and windturbines 18/11/09



Crux:

Tall wind turbines can be separated from groundclutter

But not from birds without knowledge of bird echo dynamics

And consequently not without knowledge of bird behaviour

IEA radar, radio links and windturbines 18/11/09



My intention:


Showing an overview of main classes of bird movements


Illustrating how radar ornithologists handle bird targets

Weighing the monitoring possibilities of main radar types

Advising policy makers how to avoid the impossible

IEA radar, radio links and windturbines 18/11/09


































































































Conclusions:


Digging still deeper in groundclutter than already done is not advisable


A separate small, slow and low target channel for bird and UAV monitoring improves safety, security and WT suppression

Additional medium range S-band 3D-radars are not a threat but a solution for more wind an energy 18/11/09









Comment on Eurocontrol draft-document

Focussing on the PSR paragraphs, the Eurocontrol document does not provide a recipe.

- · What is 'simple assessment', what is 'detailed assessment'?
- Is it sensible to have a simple assessment, why don't do it the detailed way?
- · How can line-of-sight actually be determined?
- · What type of terrain data is appropriate?

5 Arne Theil

THE

Features of the acceptance tool

- · Considers PSR's only
- To be used by Royal Dutch Airforce, possibly also by Air Traffic Control the Netherlands (LVNL)
- Tests buildings as well as wind turbines
- · Verdict based on Detection Probability
- Demands required radar coverage as input, i.e., an altitude profile
- Can handle multiple radar coverage profiles
- For fixed buildings: supports ICAO EUR DOC 150 profile as well as other, user-defined profiles
- PSR performance assessment based on the Blake Chart

6 Arne The



Features of the acceptance tool

- Supports sensor fusion as remedy
- Models both the shadow effect and desensitisation above (see presentation of colleague Mathijs Schouten)
- Models line-of-sight and propagation effects with Signal Science Terpem
- Intends to use high quality altitude data (AHN)
- · Obstacles can be added to the altitude data
- Models ATC as well as AD radars: Raytheon ASR-10SS (5x), Schiphol TAR4 (Grumman), Thomson MPR, also Thales SMART-S Mk2, Raytheon ASR-10SS 'upgraded' (concurrent beams, modified CFAR)

7 Arne Thei



Features of the acceptance tool



Thales SMART-S Mk 2

- The SSR is on the back
- Medium PRF waveform
- Fan beam on transmit,12 stacked beams on receive





Raytheon ASR-10SS

- Low PRF waveform
- Low beam on transmit, low and high beam on receive, switched
- Two pulselengths



Arne Theil





Conclusions • Modelling of the wind turbine clutter and its effect on radar coverage is seen as the most critical part of the programme • The intention is to verify the fidelity of the model with clutter recordings from the ASR-10SS at Soesterberg • Ready: End Q3 2010



Radar disturbance by obstacles

Prof.dr.ir. G. Brussaard Radicom Consultants



Contents

- Criterion for obstacles in vicinity of radar
- Definition of 'radar disturbance factor'
- Analysis for buildings
- Analysis for windmills

18 November 2009

Radar disturbance by obstacles

2

RADICOM

Criterion for buildings in the vicinity of air surveillance radars

- 8 air surveillance radar locations in NL
- Area within 15 nm (28 km) of radar is protected area
- All proposals for buildings above 45 m in protected areas 'must be evaluated'
- Criterion: "radar disturbance factor" must be below 10%
- Evaluation is carried out by TNO

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Radar disturbance by obstacles

3



Range reduction by obstacle

Signal loss due to obstacle is a function of

- radar cross section of obstacle
- obstacle distance
- target range

Relative range reduction ('radar disturbance factor') is


$$\Delta_R = \frac{R_u - R_o}{R_u} = 1 - \sqrt{\frac{P_o}{P_u}}$$

 R_o and R_u are obstructed and unobstructed range, respectively. P_o/P_u is the (one-way) signal loss due to the obstacle

18 November 2009

Radar disturbance by obstacles

4



RADICOM Consultants in Radiocommunication

For practical cases (non-transparent objects, target distance much larger than obstacle distance):

$$\Delta_R \approx c \frac{d}{\sqrt{r_0}}$$

- *d* is the diameter of the obstacle
- r_0 is the distance between radar and obstacle
- \bullet c is a constant dependent on frequency, width of the radar beam, shape and material of obstacle


Criterion for high-rise buildings within 15 nm (28 km) of radar:


$$\Delta_R < 10\%$$


18 November 2009


Radar disturbance by obstacles


6













Conclusions

- Relative criterion is not related to radar specifications
- Software for evaluation of radar performance against specifications is available
- Prohibition of all high-rise buildings in protected areas is a very severe measure

18 November 2009

Radar disturbance by obstacles

12







More than 600 members from almost 60 countries

- Manufacturers covering 90% of the world wind power market
- · Component suppliers
- · Research institutes
- · National wind and renewables associations
- Developers
- Electricity providers
- Finance and insurance companies
- Consultants
- Contractors


This combined strength makes EWEA the world's largest and powerful wind energy network in the world







Guidelines objectives

- Guidelines to ANSPs and wind energy developers to assess the impact of the future wind farm developments.
- Consultation process is open until Jan. 10. EWEA consulted its members to build a common position, submitted to Eurocontrol in october.
- Objectives:
 - 1/This document aims at maintaining the necessary levels of safety and efficiency of surveillance related Air Traffic Services
 - 2/ Supporting to the maximum extent possible the development of wind energy.
- · EWEA thinks the second objective is not met











Wind farm developments, some elements

- · A wind farm investment is a multi-million industrial investment
- The wind farm layout, wind turbine height, capacity and size is the result of a complex multi-parametric optimisation process:
 - Costs vs Power delivery (income and financial reliability)
 - Land property
 - Access routes
 - Grid connection
 - Visibility
 - Noise impact
 - Environment aspects: birds, bats, nature preservation...
 - Geotechnical aspects

Radars are one of the parameters to be contemplated in a global picture

STOP BUTTON? Requested for radars, birds, bats, grid operators, who else?









On the issue to work at surveillance sensor level

- "The maximum effort should be undertaken to minimise the impact for wind turbines at the earliest stages of the surveillance chain i.e. at the surveillance sensor level" and "The application of specific features at surveillance data processing level is considered as a possible mitigation although "prevention is better than a cure" is the preference of the ANSPs."
- Conservative approach leading to unnecessary project redesign
 - post-processing, data redundancy and data fusion techniques might be available to solve the issue.
 - Should be done at system level
- Assess the potential technical and operational mitigation measures in terms of radar engineering and operational implementation aspects. Assessment shall be based on <u>economic analysis of the</u> <u>proposed mitigation measures</u>







Simple assessment - PSR « 15km and line of sight »

- Simple assessment evaluates probability of detection (geometric approach) and false target reports (any turbine in line of sight)
 - Performed for each wind turbine
 - Global impact equals sum of the impacts
 - Geometric approach do not include target characteristics
 - A wind turbine is a 'false target' by default

Main concerns - an overestimation

- Sum of the impacts is the worst case
- System redundancy is not addressed (PSR/SSR)
- Filtering, signal processing techniques are not included



Buffer zones

- The limits of 15 and 16 km are arbitrary. Evaluation is performed at sensor level radar system, without post processing.
 - Firstly, an impact assessment of improving the current operational practices, software and technologies shall be performed. The limits shall be set on the basis of the best available technologies.
- Radar line of sight is an open-ended concept that could span for many kilometres beyond any influence to radar equipment.
 - There needs to be an outer limit for Zone 3 which would normally be the ANSP statutory consultation boundary.
- Zone 4 for PSR: it is unclear why this zone has been added if "no assessment" is necessary. ICAO EUR 15 does not have this extra zone.




Buffer zones

- Zone 1: ANSP do not have the mandate to forbid developments ANSPs give advices, but don't deliver building permits
- Zone extend: Zone 1+2 and Zone 3 shall be as limited as possible
 - adequate studies shall be undertaken beforehand to enable rapid evolutions in terms of surveillance engineering and operational modifications
 - A detailed description of the criterions of zonal limits shall be available on demand. Counter expertise shall be made possible and considered.
- In Zone 3: If the planning applicant contests the results of the 'simple assessment' it should undertake a <u>simple assessment</u>, with full support of ANSP.
- Zone 4 is not in line with ICAO 015 and an open ended zone based on line of sight is not relevant.



Simple assessment / detailed assessment


- Detailed assessment is the most effective way to perform the analysis – but is discouraged **the detailed engineering assessment is a very complex and lengthy process **
 - Eurocontrol therefore invites ANSRs to create 15km and 16km buffers around radars
 - The report indicates other sensors could be added in a later stage (« WAM, ADS-B, MSPSR »)
- EWEA recommends Eurocontrol provides all necessary tools and support for ANSRs to perform a detailed assessment
- The 15 and 16 km limits are arbitrary. A detailed assessment should help defining limits





Categories

- PSR: probability of detection, false target reports, 2D position accuracy, plot/track processing capabilities
- SSR: probability of detection, false target reports2D position accuracy
 - « Is the effect tolerable or not » Which criterions?
- Points refer to insufficiencies of <u>current</u> algorithms, software, materials and processing capacities, which are empirically solved for static features, but are <u>revealed</u> by the presence of wind turbines.
- An urgent action is to compensate these insufficiencies by e.g. adapting tracking systems, implementing smart tracking algorithms, advanced signal processing techniques, improved processing capabilities.





Possible mitigations: content

- Different solution proposed to mitigate impacts:
 - PSR probability of detection, false target reports, 2D position accuracy, plot/track processing capability
 - SSR probability of detection, false target reports, 2D position accuracy
- Proposals made at engineering, operational and wind farm level
 - E.g. Exploit multi-sensors synergies, signal processing techniques, move routes, modify WF project (low down turbines, move turbines, remove turbines)
- Constraint: changes should be carbon-neutral



Possible mitigations: comments

- A wind farm project is a multi-million euros investment
 - Priority shall be given to surveillance engineering and operational modification.
 - Project redesign shall be proposed as the last option.
- Any project redesign will lead to a sub-optimal configuration of the wind farm, or a sub-optimal implementation of individual wind turbines
 - Project redesign will lower the electricity production of the wind farm, and consequently lower the project benefits in terms of CO2 emissions avoidance. This issue shall be put into balance when the issue arises to compare different options of engineering / operational modification versus project redesign.
- · It is welcome that modifications shall be carbon neutral
 - this argument shall not be used to favour in-action in terms of surveillance or operational modification.



Main conclusions

- The key added value of this document is the concertation process. Such guidance is highly welcome.
 - improve dialogue and transparency between ANSPs and wind farm developers
- The draft sends contradictory messages.
 - Zoning is proposed: extended beyond what specialists consider reasonable and current practice for a detailed impact assessment, But detailed assessments are stated too complex
 - Invite the rejection of any project within 15km and in line of sight of any radar in Europe taken individually.
- If applied, would hinder EU and Member States' efforts to increase the share of renewable energy in consumption and reduce greenhouse gas and CO2 emissions.
- EWEA urges Eurocontrol to provide all necessary methods and tools to enable ANSPs and project developers to perform detailed assessment.




Main conclusions

- The approach is conservative. A review of modern technologies and algorithms shall be provided.
- As mitigation measures, emphasis is put on adapting the wind farm to the radar environment.
 - Mitigation options, be it at sensor, post-processing or operational level should be considered on an economic basis and compared to the potential economic impacts on the project itself.
- The wording chosen throughout the draft document suggests that ANSPs are themselves responsible for authorising or rejecting wind farm projects.

A more balanced proposal is required. Expected after consultation process.








Movares Background

Engineering and consultancy

- Roots: 19th century railroads
- 1.400 people
- € 140 million turnover
- · Head office: Utrecht
- Regional: Zwolle, Weesp, Eindhoven en Zoetermeer
- Europe: Poland, Portugal and Germany



18-11-2009

Railroad tracks and stations
Building and real estate
Building techniques
Consultancy
Infrastructure Installations
Light Rail
Management & processes
Energy
High voltage
Energy systems
Safety and Security
Public safety, CCTV surveillance
Railroad safety
Tunnel safety
Telecommunications, GSM special
coverage locations
Mobility
Visuals en Virtual Reality
Water
Bridges, dykes

Harbour construction Vessel traffic control

Architecture and design



Desk research project August 2009




- · Contract from Dutch Ministry of Transport and Water
- Movares preferred supplier for Rijkswaterstaat "Department North Sea"

This department is involved in all traffic and construction issues on the Dutch part of the North Sea, legislation and permits for drilling for gas etc. etc.

IEA Topical Expert 4
Meeting #60

Why this research? Permission for wind park construction at sea is given by the Ministry with some limitations and obligations: Research on the effects of wind parks on the environment: fish, dolphins, bird population, yearly north/south movement etc. Research on the effects for vessels and aircraft on radio, radar and navigation Monitoring and yearly evaluation of these effects



Why this research?

- · 2008: 9 permits for wind park design on the Dutch North Sea.
- · November 2009 final permissions for construction
- Until now broad and sometimes quite undefined requested monitoring and evaluation programs

Our mission: relevant radar and radio monitoring & evaluation proposal, based on known effects and blind spots

=> Enables to calculate costs of monitoring & evaluation in the business plan and the subsidies involved

18-11-2009

IEA Topical Expert Meeting #60




Requested input stakeholders:

- · Dutch Coastguard
- · Ecofys Netherlands (windpark development)
- · Air traffic control Netherlands (LVNL, Schiphol)
- · TNO Defense Safety and Security, The Hague

18-11-2009


IEA Topical Expert Meeting #60

























Radar observations Waker

Weather: overcast Wind: SW 4 Sea: small waves Ship light rolling

Radar: Sperry Marine Bridgemaster

X band Multipulse

Clutter Manual and AUTO

Radar set on man. clutter and normal sea operation (clutter auto)

Observations:


Head on: 2 mile


1 ½ mile 500 mtr

Parallel: 500 mtr. 1 ½ mile

During observations no small vessel present in or near the wind parks

Movares









Conclusions 1 All systems presently in use at sea and for helicopter operations are studied since 2000 Only for WAM disturbance no measurement or observations None or hardly noticeable influence on other systems than radar. Known disturbance of radar observation Disturbance of radar observation Disturbance of radar observation is influenced by the equipment used, the antenna and antenna location, and the structure of the wind park and its location. Strong interaction of observations and obstacles on the ship like masts, lines, cranes, antennas etc. and the position of the ship versus the windpark. Less use in measurement or calculation of radar effects for non stationary platforms.







Amsterdam, November 18/19, 2009 IEA Topical Expert Meeting #59

IEA_AMSTERDAM_pr.doc 11/09

"RADAR, RADIO AND WIND TURBINES"

Wind Turbines in the Radiation Field of Systems from an Analysis and Coexistence Point of View

Dr.-Ing. Gerhard Greving

NAVCOM Consult Ziegelstr. 43 D-71672 Marbach

http://www.navcom.de



⇒ Consultancy Company for services in aviation

Navaids -, Landing -, Radar -, Comm-Systems 3D - Numerical System Simulations

- ⇒ Founded by Dr.-Ing. Gerhard Greving in 1997
- ⇒ Team of former R&D and System Engineers (SEL, Alcatel, Thales)
- ⇒ Network of Specialists and cooperating companies
- ⇒ Worldwide activities on wind turbines since about 12 years
- ⇒ Independant Consultancy/Expertises



URLs for download of Technical Papers (2006ff) Radar-, Navaids-, Landing-, Comm-Systems

IEA AMSTERDAM pr.doc 11/09

NAVCOM Consult : http://www.navcom.de

Presentation papers: http://www.navcom.de/EUROCONTROL_SUR26_pr1.pdf workshop

http://www.navcom.de/WEA rad Paris pr 271107 E.pdf German/French workshop

http://www.navcom.de/iea_oxford_pr_300307.pdf __more technical details

Company Profile: http://www.navcom.de/NAVCOM comprof20.pdf

ERAD2006 / Barcelona http://www.navcom.de/erad2006pt.pdf Weather radar, WT, RCS

IFIS 2006 / Toulouse http://www.navcom.de/ifis2006ggpt.pdf also WT EURAD 2006 / Manchester: http://www.navcom.de/eurad2006pt.pdf SSR, RCS, WT

IRS 2007 Cologne EUCAP 2007 Edinburgh URSI 2008 GA/ Chicago IRS 2008 / Wroclaw

IFIS 2008 / Oklahoma IRS 2009 Hamburg IAIN 2009 Stockholm

More on request

http://www.navcom.de/irs2007pt.pdf http://www.navcom.de/eucap2007pt.pdf http://www.navcom.de/ursi2008pt.pdf http://www.navcom.de/irs2008pt.pdf http://www.navcom.de/ifs2008pdpt.pdf http://www.navcom.de/irs2009pt.pdf


http://www.navcom.de/iain2009pt.pdf

RCS and WT also WT, measures invited paper; also RCS, WT

RCS and WT also WT

RCS, WT

also WT, shadowing



Content

EA_AMSTERDAM_pr.doc 11/00

- ⇒ Introduction; Summary of Oxford 2007; RCS
- ⇒ General examples of planned/approved windparks and related systems
- ⇒ Specs and definition of distortions effects; Safeguarding areas
- ⇒ Result 1: Shadowing in the back of WT and windparks;
- ⇒ PoD global / (local)
- Result 2: False targets by multiple reflections at WT and aircraft
- ⇒ Measures for Improvement; Stealth, absorbers
- ⇒ Example
- ⇒ Concluding Remarks

5/63



IEA Expert Meeting in Oxford 2007 Short Summary


EA_AMSTERDAM_pr.doc 11/09

- ⇒ The treatment of wind turbines is different for every system
- ⇒ Simulation scheme IHSS and numerical methods available
- System Specifications, defined operational requirements to be met
- ⇒ Field interference fluctuations are not a criterion for system effects
- Effects vs "comfort" Can the mission be met?
- ⇒ scattering at WT is highly time- and space-variant
- ⇒ RCS scheme (strictly speaking) not applicable for WT → RCS
- ⇒ Examples of results for several systems presented
- Advanced system simulations on case by case basis necessary



Radar Cross Section RCS

EA AMSTERDAM pr.doc 11/09




RCS strictly speaking not applicable for wind turbines above ground


Virtual availability and simplicity not a justified reason for application RCS is highly dynamic (time, space) and a spectrum if rotating Measurements of the RCS of WT in AEC also not relevant!

NAVCOM Consult does not work with RCS for WT!

See publications and some numerical results below

7/63







Systems and General Classification

EA_AMSTERDAM_pr.doc 11/00

Windturbines and

Navigation-

Landing-

Radar- (civilian ATC, militaryAD, Meteo)


Meteo-radar measure amplitudes/speed!

Communication- Systems

Activities of NAVCOM Consult on all fields in A, B, CH, CZ, D, DK, F, GB, H, HK, K, L, N, NL, SK,

Off shore 200WT up to 1GW


- ⇒ Introduction; Summary of Oxford 2007; RCS
- ⇒ General examples of planned/approved windparks and related systems
- ⇒ Specs and definition of distortions effects; Safeguarding areas
- ⇒ Result 1: Shadowing in the back of WT and windparks;
- ⇒ PoD global / (local)
- ⇒ Result 2: False targets by multiple reflections at WT and aircraft
- ⇒ Measures for Improvement; Stealth, absorbers
- ⇒ Example
- ⇒ Concluding Remarks






Typical Examples and Background

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



MATCON Z

Wind Park with 49 Generators DVOR/TACAN/DME - Korea



Permission possible? Conditions?






NAVCOM

- ⇒ Comparable Radar and comparable Tasks yield quite different approval and acceptance procedures and results in different, partially adjacent countries
- ⇒ Why these Differences ?
- ⇒ Are these differences technically, physically and operationally justified ?

17/63

Radar and Wind Parks - EU-case 1







WTs and Radar - European Level (3)

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- ⇒ These Differences are tried to be harmonized by EUROCONTROL and NATO
- ⇒ e.g. ... Primary and Secondary Radar separately treated No collocation considered No networking or clustering No redundancy advantages
- ⇒ AD : old analog 3D-radar vs.
 3D solid state Doppler pulse compression

Content

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- ⇒ Introduction; Summary of Oxford 2007; RCS
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- ⇒ Example

21/63



Distortions of Systems

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- ⇒ What is a "distortion"? ←→ violation of specification!?
 Risk, danger, safety ←→ "comfort"
- ⇒ Does a specification for the actual system exist? ←→ Task/mission?
- ⇒ No distortions, 100% safety, 0% risk, global PoD 100% ←→ impossible
- ⇒ What is an acceptable distortion? ←→ within specs, ...
- ⇒ Is the pure visibility of windturbines by the primary radar a distortion ? (no, it's the task of a radar to see obstacles?) ←→ "comfort"? e.g. RCS=1sqm → >100km/460km
- ⇒ Moving cars/trucks on motor ways are also "visible" ←→ mitigation?

 Treated as clutter!! ←→ wind turbines

Applicable Specifications

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⇒ ICAO Annex 10 Vol. I SARPs

⇒ ICAO Annex 10 Vol. IV SARPs, no multipath spec

⇒ ICAO Annex 10 Vol. V SARPs

⇒ ICAO Doc 8071 (guidance material)

- ⇒ EUROCONTROL SUR.ET1.ST01.1000-STD-01-01 Radar EUROCONTROL SUR.ET1.ST03.1000-STD-01-01 Radar
- national specifications /rules may exist
- ➡ MIL


 For military radar often no open or applicable specs exist at all

23/63



System-Simulations result in System Parameter

System distortions by Objects on the ground
For objects on the ground: RCS is not a useful parameter
Field distortions are mostly not a useful parameter
Signal processing involved




NAVCOM Count

Radar-Types and Classification

"Mission/Task of the System"


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25/63



Classification of objects - Threat to systems



Zone definition conformal to ICAO EUR ED 015 - strict principle

60th IEA Topical Expert Meeting: "Radar, Radio Links and Wind Turbines"

Assumption:

Safe Range R2=35km for each Radar

Air Traffic Control Radar of DFS (so far no general Range; ASR, SREM, MSSR)

ATC mil (general 35km?)


ATC Radar of the USAFE/ NATO (general no problems; ←→ FAA/DFS)

Air Defence Radar of NATO/BW (generell 35km?)

16 Weather Radar of DWD (R2 of France R2=30km!)

+ local safeguarding areas for for Navigation-, Comm-Systems

27/63





Assumption:

Safe Range R2=30nm

(R2=55km) for each mil ATC Radar

←→ "Area of responsibility"

16 Weather Radar of DWD (in France R2=30km!)

←→ Repowering!?

The discussed "guideline" of EUROCONTROL would enable even much larger safeguarding areas for ATC-Radar!

IEA Wind Energy - Task 11: Base Technology Information Exchange

Safeguarding ranges EUROCONTROL Guideline

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⇒ So far only a proposal for ATC-radar → Civ, Mil

4.2.1 Primary Surveillance Radar

Zone 1 Safeguarding	Zone 2 Detailed assessment	Zone 3 Simple assessment	Zone 4 No assessment
0 - 500 m	500 m - 15 km and in radar line of sight	Further than 15 km and in radar line of sight	Not in radar line of sight
	Table 1: PSP race	ommended ranges	

PSR

no real R2!

Table 1: PSR recommended ranges

4.2.2 Secondary Surveillance Radar (classical, monopulse and Mode S)

Zone 1	Zone 2	Zone 4
Safeguarding	Detailed assessment	No assessment
0 - 500 m	500 m - 16 km and in radar line of sight	Further than 16 km or not in radar line of sight

(M)SSR

Practically worthless in case of collocated PSR/SSR

Table 2: SSR recommended ranges

Range scheme for PSR not compatible with ICAO ED 015!

29/63





Content

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- ⇒ General examples of planned/approved windparks and related systems
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- ⇒ Example
- ⇔ Concluding Remarks

Effective "shadowing" in the back of a wind turbine?







60th IEA Topical Expert Meeting: "Radar, Radio Links and Wind Turbines"

NAVCOM Consult

Primary Radar - Maximum Range Reduction Attenuation by absorption (?) or scattering




Windgenerator 12482 Patches / 110MHz ILS/VOR NAVCOM. 8 1088080 Patches / 1030MHz SSR Enercon E66 1.8/2MW ź 3D-model Windgenerator time variant scattering ca. 22/min pattern of blades Enercon E66 3D-model generator house RCS-Doppler shift 65-112n ca. 300km/h blades $f_0=0$ RCS $p_y = \lim_{p \to \infty} \frac{1}{p}$ a C quasistatic slow, wind direction RCS does not exist Dopplershiftfor real installation shaft Frequency of the scattered fields above ground! ca. 4-9m




E82 22rpm
For slower rotation: Spectral width reduces, spectral amplitudes increase

Horizontal azimuthal traces in the back of the wind turbine





Horizontal radial traces in the back of the wind turbine



37/63

Vertical elevation traces in the back of the wind turbine






"Shadowing" in the back of a

WT for an AD-Radar

Radar: Free space, ground included

Elevation trace

D1 Radar to WT: 15km D2 in the back of WT: 2km



15km D1 Radar to WT: D2 in the back of WT: 50km

39/63



Radar Basics

Probability of Detection Overall? / local?

- ⇒ PoD relevant at maximum range; complex integral term (BARTON)
- ⇒ (Local) PoD above a windpark arbitrary: between 0% and ~100%
- ⇒ EUROCONTROL: pragmatic approach RASS SUR.ET1.ST01.1000-STD-01-01 SUR.ET1.ST03.1000-STD-01-01
- ⇒ Overall probability of detection measured (N→oo; Ludloff, ...)

number of detected target reports number of expected target reports


- ⇒ PSR → 90%, SSR → 97%, combined 95% (see SUR.ET1...)
- Small reductions in the back of wind turbines and "holes" above a windpark do not affect the overall PoD significantly


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- ⇒ PoD global / (local)
- ⇒ Result 2: False targets by multiple reflections at WT and aircraft Taken from: EUROCONTROL guideline version 14
- ⇒ Measures for Improvement; Stealth, absorbers
- ⇒ Example
- ⇔ Concluding Remarks


"PSR Equations (reflections)"



Taken from Annex C of the EUROCONTROL guidelines Version 14







Modified/adapted Radar Equation: Case 1

$$P_{r} = \frac{\sigma_{A/C}\sigma_{WT1}\sigma_{WT2}F_{rWT}^{2}F_{tWT}^{2}G_{r}G_{t}\lambda^{2}}{(4\pi)^{5}D_{PSR-WT}^{4}D_{WT-A/C}^{4}}$$


σ_{A/C} RCS of aircraft mono-static


O_{WT} RCS of WT bi-static

Taken from:

[12] EUROCONTROL; Guidelines on How to Asses the Potential Impact of Wind Turbines on Surveillance Sensors; Ed. 0.14 (Draft), 17.6.09


45/63





RCS not applicable in general for objects on the ground!

47/63




Worst case 3D model of a large Enercon E82

Fully metallic blades and nacelle


Max height: 150m → up to 200m


Calculated/measured RCS only defined in free space!

Not defined above ground! ←→ arbitrary unknown error!















IEA Wind Energy - Task 11: Base Technology Information Exchange

60th IEA Topical Expert Meeting: "Radar, Radio Links and Wind Turbines"





PSR False target by Multi-scattering at WT and A/C RCS-processing

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53/63

- ⇒ Processed mono-static and bi-static RCS virtually, although not existing for WT
- ⇒ Theoretically possible only in very close unrealistic distances and for large RCS for WT and A/C
- ⇒ PSR False targets extremely unlikely due to triple multiplication of RCS and of the statistical occurrence
- ⇒ The reality: nearfield effects at WT and A/C for typical distances Small distances and low heights impossible ground effects for a 2D-radar
 - ←→ reduce maximum of scattering at WT and at A/C
 - ⇒ The generation of PSR false targets by multi-scattering at the WT and at the A/C is extremely unlikely unrealistic!



Measures to reduce/improve effects (1)

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- ⇒ for all frequencies ? ←→ system
- ⇒ under all environmental conditions ? (rain, ice, ...)
- Absorbing material ? ←→ "forward scatter" inside blades for lightning arrestor ←→ rain, carbon fibre inside the nacelle shell ←→ rain, aluminum ←→ carbon fibre
- Stealth principles ? by form and construction Effective almost only for back scatter (MTI, MTD) Not effective for forward scatter and bi-scatter (SSR,MSSR)

Questionable solutions ←→ function / technology / cost

- → cost/effort per WT seems to be not justified
- → if at all and if it works sufficiently, last method

55/63



Some types of real existing absorbers

broadband, light, thick thin, heavy, narrow-band, expensive ferrite layer (metal) ferrite magnetic absorber pyramidal foam absorber dielectric lossy layers RF transfer into heat (metal) Jaumann absorber thin lossy layer (377Ω) paint? ≥λ/4 "spacer" CA RAM Salisbury Screen absorber circuit analog radar absorbant materials", "metamaterials"

124

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- ⇒ Wind turbines are a special type "clutter"
 With a known position and a known scattering response (spectrum)
- ⇒ Clutter suppression is a "standard task" of the radar e.g. moving vehicles close to a radar are "visible" Would you try to forbid motorways?
 - → Mitigation measures in the radar
 - → Challenge to radar engineers
- ⇒ Plot losses and track losses are also daily facts
- ⇒ The most effective mitigation measures ATC

Networking, clustering (realized in most countries)
MSSR has priority vs. PSR (anyhow 2D, does not know height!!)
Gain from redundancy

→ Modern radar operation

57/63



VAVCOM

Remarks: EUROCONTROL Guidelines V14 (1) Civilian and military ATC ??

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- ⇒ see above to the safeguarding areas
- ⇒ "simple assessment" relies fully on the RCS (see above) accuracy and error fully unknown → probably exaggeration 12th version contained still a critical remark (1.4.09, §4.3.1) Some parameters do not reflect real signal processing: monopulse error
- ,detailed assessment" formally impossible to carry out Claim: All needed data not available
- ⇒ General impression: least common denominator of a group
- ⇒ worst-worst case assumptions/conditions (e.g. -77dBm; Power)
- ⇒ Most effective measures not taken into account :
 - ←→ MSSR priority; PSR for target reinforcement
 - <->
 - ←→ networking; redundancy (DFS, FAA, USAF)



Remarks: EUROCONTROL Guidelines V14 (1)

Civilian and military ATC ??

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- "Visibility" is criterion for Primary radar
- ⇒ Generally de facto dis-approval for R2<15km!
 </p>
- ⇒ Rejections possible >50km, >100km, >150km !!
- ⇒ Guidelines do not reflect the modern international ATC operation
- ⇒ Guidelines do not reflect the reality: e.g. 20000 turbines are in coexistence with ATC operation

⇒ ...

59/63



126



Conclusions for Wind Turbines WT

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- ⇒ The treatment of wind turbines is different for every system Radar, navaids, comm
- What is a "distortion" in Radar ?
- System Specifications, defined operational requirements to be met
- ⇒ Effects vs "comfort" Can the mission be met?
- ⇒ scattering at WT is highly time- and space-variant; Spectrum
- RCS scheme strictly speaking not applicable for WT
- ⇒ Modern existing HW/SW technology → far better compatibility with WT
- ⇒ Examples and results for several systems presented
- Advanced system simulations on case by case basis necessary
- Physics should be the same in each country/organisation



IEA - Amsterdam, November 18/19, 2009

EA_AMSTERDAM_pr.doc 1109

Wind Turbines in the Radiation Field of Systems from an Analysis and Coexistence Point of View

THX - Q&A

http://www.navcom.de


	60th IFA T	opical Exper	t Meeting:	"Radar	Radio I	inks and	Wind T	urhines"
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63/63















Surveillance programmes and projects

- · Maintain Surveillance infrastructure strategy,
- · Define minimum performance standards,
- · Prepare implementation of ADS-B,
- · Support states for implementation of WAM,
- Establish, for use by all ECAC states, procedures and methodologies covering:
 - Exchange of Surveillance data,
 - Harmonised performance assessment techniques,
 - · Safeguarding assessments.

EUROCONTROL presentation to the IEA Topical Expert Meeting on "Radar. Radio and Wind Turbines" Amsterdam 18-19/11/2009

5







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EUROCONTROL Regulatory and Advisory Framework (ERAF)

Two basic categories of material:

- Regulatory Material
 - ▶ Binding provisions EUROCONTROL Rule.
- Advisory Material
 - Non binding provisions EUROCONTROL Specification or Guidelines.

EUROCONTROL presentation to the IEA Topical Expert Meeting on "Radar, Radio and Wind Turbines" Amsterdam 18-19/11/2009

-



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Consultation process


Depends on the type of document:


- Specification
 - ➡ Formal consultation: EUROCONTROL Notice of Proposed Rule-Making (ENPRM) Regulatory Process.
- Guidelines
 - Informal consultation.

EUROCONTROL presentation to the IEA Topical Expert Meeting on "Radar, Radio and Wind Turbines" Amsterdam 18-19/11/2009


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


















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












































60th IEA Topical Expert Meeting: "Radar, Radio Links and Wind Turbines"

EADS - MAS Signaturtechnik, Bremen/Germany Dr. Ing. A. Frye c/o EADS GmbH, Airbusailee 1; D - 28199 Bremen





- range reductions
- *shading effects
- *angle faults vs. azimuth 3 - D - Radar systems for *angle faults vs. elevation air defence
- *false target caused by reflexions
- *disturbance zone around a wind turbine
- *track losses at overflight 2-D - Radarsystems: military airports
- *false tracks
- * turbidity of the radar image
- * interaction between existing and planned wind turbines.
- * interactions between several plannend wind turbines and other objects.
- * interactions with topography and vegatation



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Problems in the planning of wind energy projects

The Obstacle Problem

(non-technical criteria) and Operational aspects of air traffic control

Radartechnical Problems




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The overflight problem at the 2 –D – atc radar


- The extension of the disturbed zone of a wind turbine is larger at larges distances.
- The "frequency" of the disturbed zone depends of the wind turbine type



The shados effects at a air defence 3-D- radar


Scatter fields cause

- range reduction and
- position errors over azimuth & elevation



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
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Data records from a military atc radar: Example 1:

- 16 existing wind turbines (all the same WT type)
- •11 ...13 wind turbines are visible at any time
- ⇒75% detection frequency of this turbine typ



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



144

Data records from a military atc radar: Example 2:

Cluster of wind turbines

·the rcs of the wind turbines changes over the time





time 2, ca. 4 sec. later


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Data records from a military atc radar: Example 3:


Some clusters of wind turbines in different distances:

- The resolution of the radar is lower at larger distances
- •The wind turbines don't run synchronously
- The separation of wind turbines depends from the distance





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



60th IEA Topical Expert Meeting: "Radar, Radio Links and Wind Turbines"





60th IEA Topical Expert Meeting: "Radar, Radio Links and Wind Turbines"







Solutions: stealth rotos blade activities at EADS since 2003 (only for 2 -D- radar systems)

Radar signature analysis of rotor blade section



Assessment of wind turbine RCS



Evaluation of LO measures for wind rotor blades



Development of RAS concepts for wind rotors blades



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
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


Solutions for manufacturers (only for 2 -D- radar systems)

- => There is no need for a fully stealth rotor blade You cannot reduce the rcs over 3 decades
- => There is only a need for smart solutions:
- 1. To reduce the existing rate of detections
- 2. To change the doppler characteristic and to support the doppler identification

60th IEA Topical Expert Meeting: "Radar, Radio Links and Wind Turbines"








The shading problem at the 3 - D - air defence radar system

path of the propagation



Influences by all obstacles and structures !!

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
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


150

The shading problem at the 3 –D-Radar system:

- Single wind turbines are most non-critical
- Interactions at groups of wind turbines are critical





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



The shading problem at the 3 –D- Radar system:

 Wind turbine park in large, but different distances

The density and the interactions are changing over the distance

The interactions betwen the wind turbines are changing over the distance





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Solutions for wind park planners for 3 -D- Radar systems:

(for this radar type there are rules in Germany)

- 1. Radar optimised arrangement
- 2. Radar optimised size
- ⇒ There are no technical reasons to define forbidden areas

For 2 –D- Radar systems:

- ⇒ use of wind turbines with a low rotor speed
- ⇒ use of a radar optimised arrangement
- ⇒ ask for wind turbines with smart radar
- ⇒ absorbing solutions

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Perspecitives / Outlook for the authorization process process

- Predictable rules are in process for 2-d- radars, based on measurement results. (like a checklist for the legal process)
- 2. Considerartion of the charakteristika of the wind turbine type
- Integration of the influence of terrain and shading

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


Thank yor

for your

attention

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VTT TECHNICAL RESEARCH CENTRE OF FINLAND

EFFECT OF WIND TURBINES ON RADAR

Situation in Finland

- Substantial increase in wind power planned in near future
- Research work on radar effects started in June 2009 at VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, a pre-study was made during summer 2009
- A larger research project planned to start in winter 2009-2010
- Goal of the work: The Finnish Air Force needs to know what the effects are, in order to give acceptance to planned wind power projects
- Work financed by the wind power industry



1

VTT TECHNICAL RESEARCH CENTRE OF FINLAND

MAIN EFFECTS

- · Radar reflections from the wind turbine
- Shadowing of radar targets behind the wind turbine
- · Lose of tracking of targets above the wind turbine



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RESEARCH APPROACH

Electromagnetic theory and calculation methods are used to study the interaction of the radar and the wind turbine

- Analytical methods (worst case analysis)
- Numerical method using the CAST software (more accurate method)



VTT TECHNICAL RESEARCH CENTRE OF FINLAND

REQUIRED INFORMATION FOR CALCULATIONS

- · About the radar:
 - Position
 - Frequency
- · About the wind turbine:
 - Shape
 - · Dimensions
 - · Materials (metals, insulators)
 - · Possibly also inner structure
 - · Wind directions
 - · Speed of rotation
- · About the terrain:
 - (Digital) map information
 - · Vegetation



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Estimating the radar cross section (σ) of the wind turbine


- · Moving turbine blades cause Doppler shift
- The stationary tower has no Doppler shift, but σ can be very large for the perpendicular direction, $\sigma = 2\pi a L^2/\lambda$ (metal surface)


Example: For the tower, with the given values


 $\sigma \sim 1.000.000 \text{ m}^2 \text{ (} = 1 \text{ km}^2\text{)}$

In reality, σ is somewhat smaller, because the wind turbine is not in the far field of the radar, but still very large.


Can cause saturation in the radar receiver, disturbs signal processing functions.










Line-of-sight radio propagation For unobstructed radio propagation between A and B, it is required that the first Fresnel zone (with radius r) is free from obstacles. $r = \sqrt{\lambda d_1 d_2 / (d_1 + d_2)}$ A can be radar, B can be target









VTT TECHNICAL RESEARCH CENTRE OF FINLAND

Numerical versus analytical simulation

- The disadvantage of the analytical method is that the worst-case results are too pessimistic, too much on the safe side
- This leads to rejection of wind power projects, which could have been accepted with a more accurate simulation method
- · A more accurate numerical simulation method is clearly needed




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Numerical simulation method


- VTT has developed radar cross section simulation software CAST, funded mostly by Finnish Navy
- CAST is capable of accurate and fast simulation of complex targets described by their 3D CAD models
- CAST can be used to simulate the electromagnetic scattering of wind turbines, if their CAD models are available
- For accuracy, near field effects should be included. CAST can be modified to take that into account.






VTT TECHNICAL RESEARCH CENTRE OF FINLAND


Radar Cross Section (σ) of the wind turbine tower, CAST simulation








Thank you










































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
- · The problem
- Site description
- Policy solution
- · Technical solution
- · The way ahead


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

















The policy solution The aviation specification

- Full radar performance outside a volume defined as 2 km around the wind farm area - between sea level and 2500 feet altitude
- Probability of detection $P_D \ge 80 \%$ of 1 m² Swerling case-1 target outside a volume limited by horizontal distance of 2 km from a turbine and a horizontal plane at 2500 feet (750 m) above mean sea level.
- Within the above volume, a probability of detection $P_D > 0$ % is not required
- This is the result of negotiated compromise between what can be achieved (mitigation measures) and what can be accepted by UK MoD








Technical solution

- · Main features
 - -Probability of detection $P_D \ge 80 \%$ of 1 m^2 Swerling case 1 target
 - -Coherent pulse Doppler system
 - -Short pulses (≥ 0.1 μsec)
 - -High range accuracy
 - Narrow antenna beam width (0.4°-0.8°)
 - -X-band and/or S-band
 - -High availability (≥ 99.995 %)
 - -Plot extractor and data feed connected to the UCCS
- The identified solution has high performance, solid state, no radhaz, low weight and volume, low power consumption, short lead times, high availability and low price



Signal transfer

- The gapfiller will be remote controlled through a local area network.
- Gapfiller signals will be transferred ashore through an optical fibre cable to the Salle substation control centre.
- A leased line from British
 Telecom will transfer the gapfiller
 signals to the UCCS at
 Trimingham radar head.
- · Crypto will not be required.



Current issues

- Two studies initiated by BWEA are under way on contract with UK MoD:
 - One ADATS study will investigate what needs to be carried out to increase number of data ports available within the UCCS to receive data from 2D ATC radar systems; f.ex. gapfillers.
 - -One IBM study will specify the data transport from a gapfiller to the UK Air Surveillance Command and Control System (UCCS). It will assess the feasibility of data transport from ATC radar systems into the UCCS software.
 - -The studies will specify technical considerations as well as cost estimates and are expected to be finished by the end of 2009.
 - -Any cost related to gapfillers are expected to be covered by utilities.

15



The way ahead

- Gapfiller concept solution defined Q4 2009
- · Gapfiller system integration contract signature Q2 2010
- · Gapfiller lead times of 6-9 months
- · Gapfiller installation Q2 2011
- Wind farm test operation from Q4 2011
- Flight trials Q4 2011 Q1 2012
- · Approved system Q2 2012





Wind turbines and radars



Yttre Stengrund

Photo: Åke Krantz, Saabgroup



Agenda

- 1. Background
- The challenge: co-existence between radars and wind turbines
- Flight tests
- 4. Results and conclusions from flight tests
- Summary



Background

Sweden

- Total electric consumption per year, ca 150 TWh.
- Government planning goal is 30 TWh produced by wind power in the year 2020
- Today: 2 TWh from wind power
- The number of turbines is about 1000.






Background

- The Swedish Armed Forces take every wind power project under consideration and give their opinion about it (conflicts with radars, radio relay links, airfields, land-, sea- or air exercise areas, etc.)
- The Swedish Armed forces has a strong legal support in their opinion, and it is difficult to appeal against this type of military decision.

Conclusion: It can in some situations exist conflicts between different national goals





1. Background

Radar surveillance over the sea:

- · National security
- The Schengen agreement

The challenge: co-existence between radars and wind turbines

Three identified fields of challenges:


- Radar shadow behind the turbines/towers
- Doppler effects from rotating turbine blades
- Unwanted returns ("ghost targets") due to reflections



The challenge: co-existence between radars and wind turbines

Radar shadow from off shore turbines:

Obstacles in front of the radar conceal the target that the radar is supposed to discover.



The challenge: co-existence between radars and wind turbines

Why focus on the <u>radar shadow</u>?

Some arguments:

- It was (and is) the basis for the assessment that is used in the Swedish Armed Forces planning tool
- The purpose of radar surveillance: to discover real targets (the other problems are also important, but with limited resources a decision had to be made on the scope of studies)
- Limited knowledge of the spread of the radar shadow (width, length, compactness and so on).
- Despite what the phenomenon is called "shadow or something else..." it affects radar performance



3. Flight tests

Selection (a)

Constitution (a)


Flight tests

Main test

 Get an understanding of the attenuation of the received signal behind the wind turbines

Complementary flight test


- Which is the reduction in range for the radar for a target with known cross section area (in this case a sphere)
 - Flight tests with a sphere towed by the aircraft in a situation without turbines
 - Flight tests with a sphere towed by the aircraft in a situation with turbines



3.Flight tests

Simulation (before the flight tests)





Results and conclusions from the Flight tests

Assessment process

- Revise how to formulate the requirement ("approve" or "reject") for an acceptable disturbance on radars from turbines.
- Not SIR only (disadvantage: calculations ignore the actual size of the target)
- Combine technical and operational assessment


Results and conclusions from the Flight tests

Technical assessment; possible mitigations?

- Move a land based radar to another position
- Increase of radar's antenna height
- Complete with land based radars
- · Complete with radars off shore (Schengen)



Results and conclusions from the Flight tests



"Radar test 2" has a terrain mask to WP Park. Little overlap of radar coverage.

Increase antenna height???

"Radar test" has shadowed sector behind wind turbines

kchange 185

Results and conclusions from the Flight tests

Operational assessments:

- Value different locations (more or less sensitive)
- Value different directions for a given location



5. Summary

- Concerning radars and wind turbines
- -Easy rule of thumb to assess for on land turbines and disturbances on radars
- -More complicated to assess off shore turbines and their disturbances on coast based radars.
- Flight tests indicate that the reduction in a radar's range can be 14-25% in a situation due to turbines
- Other areas to focus on in the future: Doppler effects, unwanted returns ("ghost targets"), clutter etc



5. Summary

- · Big targets are normally no problem for the radar
- Targets however, have a tendency to get "smaller" due to stealth technology
- Perform a combined technical and operational assessment
- Continue studying doppler effects, ghost targets, clutter and so on



Contact


Kjell-Åke Eriksson Swedish Defence Materiel Administration


Phone: 46 8 782 6717


Mobile: 46 70 5599833


E-mail: kjell-ake.eriksson@fmv.se
















What Reduced detection capability means that a) a target is visible only at shorter distances, or b) has to be larger to be seen at the same distance. We use 'relative detection distance', which indicates a change in detection for the same target. This relates to the definition of your required coverage.




















Doppler processing: three scenarios rcs estimates based on published observations and modelling. · Target in zero doppler bin: · Clutter from tower and nacell adds up to the already most cluttercontaminated doppler-cell. · Wind turbine RCS 100-1000 m2 · Target in a bin contaminated by turbine clutter · Combine statistics for occurrence of blade flashes Blade flash: 10 - 100 m2 1 - 10 m2 No blade flash · Target not in a doppler contaminated bin Den Haag, donderdag 25 juni 2009 IEA Amsterdam, November 2009







Conclusions turbine clutter

- Noticeable effects. Exact quantification not feasible due to many parameters of influence.
- In a part of the airspace above and around the windfarm detection may not be possible.
- For the case at hand, targets are still likely detected most of the time, due to their size, and height above the wind farm.
- With multiple wind turbines, clutter values may simply be added up.

17 IEA Amsterdam, November 200

Den Haag, donderdag 25 juni 2009




Overall conclusions


- Shadowing is not often a likely source of operational problems.
- Turbine clutter is.
 - for certain scenarios (smaller targets)
 - and locations (where do you need detection capability)
 - Smarter CFAR processing can (and will soon) strongly reduce the impacted area.
- Shadow effects and their impact can be modelled adequately.
- Clutter effects and their impact can be roughly estimated.


8 IEA Amsterdam, November 2009

Den Haag, donderdag 25 juni 2009

























Wind turbines and radar → Wind turbines can cause: → Obscuration, → False plots and → False tracks → Characteristics wind turbine detections by S-band radar → Wind turbine RCS often larger than the moving and hovering helicopter RCS → Both, helicopters and wind turbines, show a wide Doppler spectrum due to the rotating blades → Wind turbine spectrum strongly depends on the aspect angle and Line of Sight



























Conclusion Effectiveness wind turbine classificator: Life trials at sea with regular air targets showed that no radar performance degradation Life trials of helicopter over wind farm showed: No false track generation induced by wind turbines No track lost of a slow moving helicopter and hovering helicopter over a wind farm No track lost if the helicopter took cover behind the wind farm More than 90 % of the wind turbine detections are classified as wind turbine detections











Understanding the Impact of Wind Turbines on Radar

- •Microwave Communications and UHF Telemetry Links
- •Interference Mechanisms and Clearance Calculations




Microwave Links and UHF Telemetry


Microwave Communications Links





- •Systems require Line of Sight to work correctly
- •Used in communications between satellites and base stations e.g. Emergency Services
- 'Backbone' carriers for cellular systems














Exclusion plotting and clearance calculation

Fresnel Zone Calculation


Using the correctly surveyed data, an exclusion zone around the link path can be calculated.

This exclusion zone is based on the second 'Fresnel Zone'

This method is the approach recommended by Ofcom in the UK, when the exact antenna locations are known

Pager Power also include an additional 25m 'buffer zone'





Microwave Links and UHF Telemetry

UHF Telemetry Links



- Operate at a lower frequency (usually UHF)
- •Do not need full line of sight
- •Used by utilities e.g. Gas, Water & Electricity companies



Inaccuracies and Surveying



When link information is obtained it is very often inaccurate – the provided co-ordinates for mast ends are often only to the nearest100 metres.

The link operators will often request large exclusion zones around the link paths in order to protect their links.

Only by surveying the mast ends, can link ends be plotted accurately as constraints on a proposed development



